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RECENT CASES

development of education in North Dakota which is essential to the
welfare of its people. .. .
SIMONE SANDBERG

SHOP ACT-TAVERN
INTOXICATING LIQUORS-DRAM
LIABLE FOR INJURIES OF AN INTOXICATED PATRON

OWNER

HELD

While decedent was a patron of defendants'1 bar, defendants or
their employees served alcohol to decedent which, resulted in decedent''S intoxication. While intoxicated, decedent engaged in activities
which resulted in injuries which caused his death.3 Plaintiff4
brought an action under Michigan's wrongful death act, 5 alleging
that defendants knew decedent was an alcoholic, had agreed not to
serve decedent any alcoholic beverages, and that therefore defendants were guilty of gross negligence and willfull wanton and intentional misconduct in serving the decedent. 6 Defendants filed a mo-

tion for summary judgment based on Michigan's dram shop act,?
61.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-38.1-01 (1971).

1. At the time the action was brought defendants owned the bar in which decedent
was allegedly served alcoholic beverages. Redford Township, a Michigan Public Body
Corporation, was also a defendant but was not involved in the appeal. Grasser v. Fleming.
74 Mich. App. 338, -,
253 N.W.2d 757, 758 (1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Plaintiff was executrix of her deceased father's estate. IE.
5. Id. Michigan's wrongful death act, Micn. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 600.2921 (Supp. 1977)
states as follows:
All actions and claims survive death. Actions on claims for injuries which
result in death shall not be prosecuted after the death of the injured person
except pursuant to the next section. If an action is pending at the time of
death the claim may be amended to bring it unier the next section. A failure
to so amend will amount to a waiver of the claim for additional damages resulting from death.
MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922(1) (1968) states as follows:
Whenever the death of a person or injuries resulting in death shall be caused
by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect, or default Is such as
would, If death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain
an action and recover damages, in respect thereof, then and In every such
case, the person who or the corporation which would have been liable, if death
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the
death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused
under such circumstances as amount In law to felony. All actions for such
death, or injuries resulting In death, shall be brought only under this section.
6. 74 Mich. App. at -,
253 N.W.2d at 758.
7. Id. Michigan's dramshop act, MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 1977) states
as follows:
Every wife, husband, child, parent, guardian, or other persons who shall be
Injured In person or property, means of support or otherwise, by a visibly
intoxicated person by reason of the unlawful selling, giving, or furnishing to
any such persons any Intoxicating liquor and the sale Is proven' to be a proximate cause of the injury or death, shall have a right of action In his or her
name against the person who shall by such selling or giving any such liquor
have caused or contributed to the intoxication of said person or persons who
shall have caused or contributed to any such injury and the principal and
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requesting that the action be dismissed for failure to join decedent
as a party defendant." The trial court denied the motion. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that a common law action did exist
against the tavern owner for serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated
person. Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich. App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757
(1977).
Traditionally, the common law did not impose liability on tavern
owners for damage or injuries sustained by either third persons"
or the intoxicated patron himself'0 as a result of the intoxicated patron's actions after the tavern owner served the patron liquor. One
rationale for this was that the consumption rather than the sale by
the tavern owner was the proximate cause of the damage or injuries.1 Other rationales given for the common law rule of no liability were that the sale of liquor to an "able-bodied" person does
not constitute negligence 12 and that it is not reasonably foreseeable
that the sale of intoxicating liquor will result in damage or injuries
to third persons far removed from the establishment where the liquor
was sold.' 3
State legislatures have responded to the common law rule of no
liability on the tavern owner for damages or injuries sustained by
third persons by adopting dram shop acts.' 4 These statutes impose
some form of strict liability on tavern owners for the acts of intoxicated patrons. 15 Dram shop acts often impose arbitrary statutory
limitations on recovery. Some acts limit recovery to the immediate
family of the intoxicated patron,18 while others place an arbitrary
sureties to any bond given under the law shall be liable, severally and jointly,
with the person or persons selling, giving or furnishing any spiritous, intoxicating, or malt liquors as aforesaid. . . . In case of death of either party,
the action or right of action given In this section shall survive to or against
his or her executor or administrator ...
8. 74 Mich. App. at , 253 N.W.2d at 758. Michigan's dram shop act requires that
the Intoxicated patron be joined as a party defendant before a suit can be brought under
the act. See supra note 7.
9. See, e.g., Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 800 (D.
Ala. 1950); Collier v.
Stamatis, 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945) ; Carr v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656
(1965) ; Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d 69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (196-R) :
Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383 (1967) ; Elder v. Fisher, 247 Ind. 598, 217
N.E.2d 847 (1966); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Beck v.
Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955).
10. See, e.g., Noonan v. Golick, 19 Conn. Supp. 308, 112 A.2d 892 (1955); Manthel v.
Heimerdinger, 332 Ill. App. 335, 75 N.E.2d 132 (1947).
11. Collier v. Stamatis. 63 Ariz. 285, 162 P.2d 125 (1945)
Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa
358. 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958) ; Beck v. Groe, 245 Minn. 28, 70 N.W.2d 886 (1955); Selbel
v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
12. Cole v. Rush, 4.5 Cal. 2d 345, 289 P.2d 450 (1955)
Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248
La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966) ; Farmers Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117
N.W.2d 347 (1962) ; Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939).
13. Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958).
14. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-103 (1973)
IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West. 1949); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964): Mic-i.
Comp. LAWS ANN. § 436.22 (1967); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West. 1972); N.Y. GEN.
OBLTO. LAW § 11-101 (McKinnev 1964) : N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 37, § 131 (1957) ; OR. Rrv. STAT. § 80.730 (1975) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 501 (1972)
Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 176.35 (West. 1974).
15. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-5-71 (1975) ; ME. REv. STAT. tit. 17, § 2002 (1964).
16. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.730 (1975) ; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-34 (1959 & Supp. 1975).
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dollar limitation on the amount recoverable. 1
Dram shop acts often impose liability on the tavern owner without any showing of the proximate cause of the injury. Thus, in cases
where a patron committed suicide after intoxication, 1' or a third
party was shot by an intoxicated patron,19 the plaintiffs have recovered against the tavern owner without proof of the proximate cause
of the injury.
Although many states have adopted dram shop acts,20 the issue
of the common law liability of the tavern owner for damages or injuries sustained by either third persons or the intoxicated patron is
nevertheless alive. 2" Some states do not have dram shop acts.22 In
states that have such statutes, a plaintiff's suit may not fit under
the dram shop act.23 That was the situation in Grasser v. Fleming.
Under Michigan's dram shop act plaintiff was required to join
the intoxicated person as a party defendant.24 Plaintiff, however,
was executrix of the intoxicated person's estate 25 and was bringing
suit in his behalf under Michigan's wrongful death act. 6 To require
plaintiff in this case to join the intoxicated person as a party defendant would have resulted in plaintiff also being a defendant. 2'7
In states which have adopted dram shop acts, one of the strongest arguments against recognizing a common law cause of action
against the tavern owner is that the legislature has preempted the
field. 2 8 In Grasser, the court concluded that the legislature did not
preempt the field, 9 resting its conclusion on the following four reasons: (1) previous cases have permitted a common law action for
failing to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition; 30
(2) "[d]ramshop acts were passed because under the common law
it was not a tort to sell or furnish intoxicating liquor to an ordinary
17. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (Vest 1972) ($250,000 per person and $500,000
per each illegal sale).
18. Bistline v. Ney Bros., 134 Iowa 172, 111 N.W. 422 (1907).
19. Cox v. Hrnsky, 318 I1. App. 287, 47 N.E.2d 728 (1943).
20. See supra note 14.
21. See, e.g., Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1976)
Robinson v. Bognanno, Iowa, 213 N.W.2d 530 (1973).
22. E.g., Alaska, California, New Mexico.
23. See, e.g., Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1960)
(This case involved an action by a Michigan resident
who was injured in Michigan by an intoxicated Illinois motorist. Defendant was an Illinois liquor store. Although both Illinois and Michigan had dram shop acts, neither applied
outside of the state); Cowman v. Hansen, 250 Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958)
(Iowa's
dram shop act did not apply because the tavern owner had sold 3.2 beer and the act di'I
not cover beer with less than four percent alcohol).
24. See sipra
note 7.
25. 74 Mich. App. at , 253 N.W.2d at 758.
26. Id. See supra note 5, for quotation of Michigan's wrongful death act.
27. 74 Mich. App. at , 253 N.W.2d at 758.
28. Robinson v. Bos-nanno, Iowa-, 213 N.W.2d. 530 (1973). In Beck v. Groe, 245
Minn. 28, 37, 70 N.W.2d 886, 893 (1955), the court stated as follows: "[T]he courts cannot adopt rules . . . which the legislature did not when it considered the matter." The
statement, however, was made in the context of determining whether 3.2 beer was an "intoxicating liouor" within the meaning of Minnesota's drain shop act.
29. 74 Mich. App. at , 253 N.W.2d at 761.
30. Id. at , 253 N.W.2d at 760.
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able-bodied man;" 31 (3)

the common law recognized an exception

where the patron could not exercise rational judgment;32 and (4) "it
would be inequitable not to allow a consumer a remedy for the in3
tentional, reckless or grossly negligent conduct of a tavern owner."
Although courts have been abandoning the common law rule with
respect to liability of tavern owners when sued by injured third
the rule when the inparties'3 4 they have been hesitant to abandon
35
toxicated patron is bringing the action.
In an effort to allow recovery for the patrons' as well as the
third parties' injuries, however, courts are finding rationales to support recovery in spite of the patron's contributory negligence. One
rationale used by courts is to recognize that the patron is contributorily negligent, 36 but nevertheless place liability on the tavern owner
because he had the "last clear chance ' ' 37 to prevent the damage
or injuries.3 8
Another rationale for allowing recovery is exemplified by the
case of Sorenson v. Olde Milford Inn,'3 9 in which the court relied on sec-

tion 483 of the Restatement of Torts in holding that the New Jersey
31.

Id.

32.
33.

Id.
Id.

at -

, 253 N.W.2d at 761 (decedent was a sick, elderly alcoholic).

34. Waynick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
360 U.S. 903 (1960); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Smith v.
Clerk, 411 Pa. 142, 190 A.2d 441 (1963) ; Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d
755 (1965). In Mitchell, the court rejected the contention that consumption was the proximate cause and relied on foreseeability of harm as the correct test of liability. Id. at
393 S.W.2d at 757.
35. In Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 486 P.2dl 151 (1971), the Supreme Court of California recognized a common law cause of action against the tavern
owner by an injured third person. The court found that the sale of the intoxicating bev, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 631, 486 P.2d
erage was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. at at 159. But the courts of appeals in both the second an.d third districts of California
have subsequently held that the intoxicated patron has no common law action against the
seller of intoxicating beverages. In Kindt v. Kauffman, 57 Cal. App. 3d 845, 129 Cal. Rptr.
603, 611 (1976), the court held that the customer had no cause of action since he had
knowingly engaged in willfu!l misconduct in becoming intoxicated. In Cooper v. Nat'l R.R.
119 Cal. Rptr. 541, 544 (1975) the court dePassenger Corp., 45 Cal. App. 3d 283, -,
nied recovery to the drinker, reasoning that the drinking was the proximate cause of the
Injuries. The court also held that the drinker's action was barred by assumption of risk
even though the seller may have been negligent or in violation of the law when he sold
the liquor. Id.
, 213 N.W.2d 530, 531-32 (1973), the court
In Robinson v. lBoganno, Iowaheld that there was no common law right of recovery against the tavern owner by a
patron injured because of his intoxication.
36. In Ramsey v. Anteil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965). the court allowed thepatron
to recover for injuries he received as a result of his intoxication. However, the court held
that contributory negligence would have barred patron's action had that doctrine been
211 A.2d at 9101. In states that have adopted the
found to apply in that case. Id. at -,
comparative negligence rule, which apportions damages according to fault rather than
being a complete defense, the negligence of the intoxicated patron would merely reduce
damages rather than completely bar them. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 67 (4th ed. 1971).
37. The last clear chance doctrine states tha.t although plaintiff may have been guilty
of contributory negligence, he should nevertheless recover because defendant had the last
opportunity to prevent the damage or injuries. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 66 (4th ed.
1971).
La., 326 So. 2d 831, 837 (1976), the court recog38. In Pence v. Ketchum, nized that plaintiff was contributorily negligent but relied on the doctrine of last clear
chance to Imnose liability on the tavern owner.
39. 46 N.J. 582., 218 A.2d 630 (1966).
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statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol to intoxicated persons was enacted "to protect a class of persons from their inability to exercise
self-protective care,'

40

and that the intoxicated patron was a mem-

ber of that class. The Sorenson court followed the lead of other courts
when it looked to a violation of the New Jersey statute making the
sale of alcohol unlawful to certain classes of people as a basis of
placing liability on the tavern owner. 4 1 Basing civil liability on
such a criminal statute, however, requires a showing both that the
plaintiff is a member of the class of persons for whose protection the
statute was enacted, 42 and that the plaintiff has suffered the type of
43
injury which the statute was intended to prevent.
The courts also rely on policy considerations when placing lia44
bility for injuries to patrons or third parties on the tavern owner.
Some arguments in favor of abrogation of the common law rule of
no liability are as follows: (1) the risk of physical and mental injuries and other damage caused by alcohol outweighs any socially
redeeming qualities of the sale ,of alcohol;4 5 (2) the tavern owner
is much better able to reduce the risk of damage or injuries by reasonably controlling consumption by his patrons than is an innocent
third party or a patron too intoxicated to realize the danger;4 6
(3) the tavern owner is better able to spread the loss and ultimately
pass that loss on to the consumers of alcohol; 47 and (4) the imposition of liability on the tavern owner may be a deterrent to negligent
48

sales.

In Grasser v. Fleming"9 the court did not address the issue of
contributory negligence because generally contributory negligence
is not a defense to aggravated forms of negligence,50 and plaintiff
alleged that defendant tavern owners were guilty of "gross negligence
and wilful, wanton and intentional misconduct." 5' Instead, the court
looked to the physical and mental conditions of the decedent as the
vital factor in determining liability. 52 The decedent was an alcoholic

and the defendants were aware of that fact. 53 Since the decedent's
will to refrain from drinking was so impaired that it was not possible
40. Id. at -,
218 A.2d at 635, quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 483 (1934).
41. Schelin v. Goldberg, 188 Pa. Super. 341, 146 A.2d 648 (1958)
(plaintiff allowed to
recover on the grounds that a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to intoxicated persons
was adopted for the protection of the general public, including the patron, and that a sale
by defendant tavern owner in violation of that statute constituted negligence on his part).
42. AV. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 192 (4th ed. 1971).,
43. Id. at 195.
44. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968)
Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
45. Note, Dram Shop Liability-A
Judicial Response, 57 CAL. L. REV. 1017 (1969).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. 74 Mich. App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757 (1977).
50.
V. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971).
51. 74 Mich. App. at , 253 N.W.2d at 758.
52. Id. at -,
253 N.W.2d at 761.
53. Id. at
, 253 N.W.2d at 758.
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for him to refuse a drink, the court rejected the common law rule
that consumption is presumed to be the proximate cause of the
damages or injuries sustained by the intoxicated patrons.5 4 Instead,
the court )held that under these facts the issue of proximate cause
is properly left to the jury. " The court was not rejecting the common
law doctrine that it is not negligence to sell to an "able-bodied"
man, but instead placed emphasis on the allegation by plaintiff
that the decedent was a "sick, elderly man, an habitual drunkard,
unable to tolerate drink." 56
The North Dakota Supreme Court has not decided whether either
a third person or a patron has a common law cause of action against
the tavern owner independent of North Dakota's dram shop act.5 7
The North Dakota act is broader than the dram shop acts of several
other states. Some states' dram shop acts require that the intoxicated
patron be joined as a party defendant." Others limit recovery to the
immediate family of the intoxicated patron. 59 North Dakota's act
has neither of these limitations. Since North Dakota's dram shop
act is relative broad, an injured third party has a comparatively
greater chance of fitting his action under the statute. North Dakota's act does not give the intoxicated patron a cause of action,
however, so the issue of common law liability must still be resolved.6 0
North Dakota also has a statute prohibiting the sale of alcohol
to certain individuals.6 1 The courts in North Dakota can look to a violation of the statute as a means of imposing liability on the tavern
owner independent of the dram shop act.6 2 In North Dakota, how3
ever, violation of a statute is merely evidence 'of negligence.
Although a majority of recent decisions abrogate the common
law rule with respect to liability to third persons for damage or in54.

Id.

at -

, 253 N.W.2d at 762.

55. Id. At common law it was presumed that consumption rather than the sale was the
proximate cause of the damages or injuries. Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 32, 294
N.E.2d 884, 887 (1973).
56. 74 Mich. App. at , 253 N.W.2d at 761. The court also recognized an exception
to the common law rule when the patron is in such a state that he could no longer exercise rational judgment. Id. But see Majors v. Brodhead Hotel, 416 Pa. 265, 205 A.2d 873,
877 (1965). The court in Majors held that the distinction between serving a sober patron
and one already intoxicated was immaterial.
57. N.D. CENT. COOE § 5-01-06 (1975) which states as follows:
Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who shall be
injured in person, property or means of support by any intoxicated person,
or in consequence of intoxicatiln, shall have a right of action against any
person who shall have casel such Intoxication by disposing, selling, barterIng, or .iving away alcoholic beverages contrary to statute for all damages
sustained.
58. See, e.g., Mici. COMP. LAws ANN. § 436.22 (Supp. 1977).
59. See supra note 16.
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1975).
61. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (197F)
states as follows: "Any nersol delivering alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an habitual drunkard, an incompetent, or an intoxicated person is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor ...
"
62. In Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 164, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631, 4S6 P.2d 151, 159
(1971), the court held that a tavern owner's duty and standard of care could be found In
a statute prohibiting the sale of *ntoxicating liquors to certain classes of people.
63. Glatt v. Feist, 156 N.V.2d 819 (N.D. 1968).
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juries suffered as a result of the patron's intoxication,6 4 it is difficult to speculate about the probable decision of North Dakota's
Supreme Court should it have the opportunity to decide the issue. In
a suit by the intoxicated patron for his damage or injuries it is
even more difficult to speculate about the probable decision of the
supreme court.
The Michigan Court of Appeals in Grasser v. Fleming, in following the trend of increasing liability of tavern owners for negligent sales, rendered a decision in accordance with society's struggle
against increasing problems of alcoholic abuse. By placing a
greater liability on tavern owners, courts will force them to use more
discretion when serving alcohol to patrons likely to cause damage or
injuries either to themselves or third persons. Although the decision
in the instant case could be viewed as a minor expansion of common
law liability, because the decedent was a known alcoholic and defendants had agreed not to serve him, courts should view the decision as a major expansion of common law liability and should
follow the decision.
DAVE

F.

SENGER

CRIMINAL LAW-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS OBTAINED DURING IN-CUSTODY INTERROGATION NOT ADMISSIBLE WITHOUT
PROOF OF WAIVER OF DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Defendant W-s-arrested, arraigned, and committed to jail in
Davenport, Iowa, for abducting a ten-year-old girl in Des Moines,
Iowa.' Before being transported back to Des Moines, defendant was
advised not to make any statements until after consulting with his
Des Moines lawyer. 2 The police officers who were to accompany
him agreed not to question him during the trip.3 One of the officers,
64. See, e.g., Deeds v United States, 306 F Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969) ; Davis v. Shlappscossee, 155 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1963); Adamian v. Three Sons, 353 Mass. 4,98, 233 N.E.2d
18 (1968) ; Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959) ; Jardine v. Upper Darby
Lodge, 413 Pa. 626, 198 A.2d 550 (1964).

I.

Williams abducted Pamela Powers on the afternoon of December 24, 1968, at the

Des Moines YMCA. His abandoned car was found the following day in Davenport, Iowa,
about 160 miles east of Des Moines. A warrant was then issued for his arrest. On the
morning of December 26, a Des Moines lawyer named Henry McKnight went to the Des
Moines police station and informed the officers present that he had Just received a long
distance call from Williams, and that he had advised Williams to turn himself in to the
Davenport police. Williams surrendered to the police in Davenport. He was booked on a
charge of abduction and given the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). Brewer v. Williams, -U.S., 97 S.Ct. 1232, 1235 (1977).
2. Id.
3. Id.

